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This thesis examines the Republic of Bulgaria’s efforts since 1989 for NATO 
membership within the broader context of Alliance reform The new democracies that emerged 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe had to face new political and security challenges, which 
were remnants of the Soviet influence. 
This work focuses on the initial idea of NATO membership, its evolution within the 
Bulgarian political scene from 1989 to 2001, and the hurdles its proponents faced. In addition it 
analyses the political implications the quest for NATO membership had on Bulgaria’s domestic 
and foreign policy. 
 This thesis delineates the steps the current Bulgarian government has initiated and is 
employing to strengthen peace, stability and confidence building in the Balkans. Bulgaria’s 
performance within the framework of Partnership for Peace (PfP), Membership Action Plan 
(MAP) and its efforts during the 1998-1999 Kosovo crisis bode well for Bulgaria’s future 
contributions to NATO. 
The Republic of Bulgaria is one of Eastern European countries that overthrew a 
communist regime and established a viable democracy. While Bulgaria recognizes the need for 
stronger security guarantees because of its size and the geopolitics of the region, it sees NATO 
membership not only as a provider of security guarantees but as a way to ensure the continued 
evolution and consolidation of democracy as well. Additionally, the country desires to embrace 
the European and Trans-Atlantic values with NATO being the best vehicle to promote these 
values and relations.  
 x 
 
The possibility for future Bulgarian membership in NATO is encouraging. Factors such 
as its pro-western President, who advances a positive worldview of Bulgaria and a stable 
government, contribute to Bulgaria’s efforts aimed at membership in the Alliance. Additionally, 
Bulgaria’s NATO-member neighbours Greece and Turkey strongly support future membership. 
Tri-national projects and efforts initiated by these countries show they can work together, 
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This thesis examines the Republic of Bulgaria’s efforts since 1989 for NATO 
membership within the broader context of Alliance reform The new democracies that emerged 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe had to face new political and security challenges, which 
were remnants of the Soviet influence. 
The profound changes in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 have provided 
the countries of that part of the continent a unique opportunity to re-integrate 
into the community of free and democratic nations. In striving to join the Euro-
Atlantic institutions, the new European democracies are seeking both to put the 
legacy of the communist past behind them for good and to contribute – of their 
own free will – to the building of a new, united Europe. This integration strategy 
is also motivated by justifiable security concerns, as demonstrated by the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The formula of security through integration and 
cooperation has gained growing support as the most promising tool for 
enhanced regional stabilization and security.1 
 
 This work focuses on the initial idea of NATO membership, its evolution within the 
Bulgarian political scene from 1989 to 2001, and the hurdles its proponents faced. In addition it 
analyses the political implications the quest for NATO membership had on Bulgaria’s domestic 
and foreign policy. 
 This thesis delineates the steps the current Bulgarian government has initiated and is 
employing to strengthen peace, stability and confidence building in the Balkans. Bulgaria’s 
                                                                 
1 Nadezhda Mihailova, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria, Security in South-Eastern 
Europe and Bulgaria’s Policy of NATO Integration, Spring 1998, Available 
[Online]<:http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-02htm;[9 November 2000] 
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performance within the framework of PfP, MAP and its efforts during the 1998-1999 Kosovo 
crisis bode well for Bulgaria’s future contributions to NATO. 
A.  BACKGROUND 
For more than four decades the world was divided into the Eastern and Western Blocs. 
Each side was not only politically aligned but was also militarily protected by its own security 
organization, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, respectively. 
After the dissolution of these blocs and the tremendous changes in the world order in 
1989, it became clear that the people previously divided by these political and military blocs 
actually shared common concerns, values and interests. Eastern and Central European Warsaw 
Pact countries demonstrated a desire to trespass the old boundaries and join their “former 
adversaries.” Thus NATO became the guarantor of peace and stability not only in Western 
Europe but in Central and Eastern Europe as well. 
Faced with these challenges NATO embarked on a process of internal change and 
adaptation to find the best mechanisms to respond to the needs of former Warsaw Pact 
countries looking for security guarantees. In addition to its core function of “collective defense”, 
NATO assumed a new “collective security” role. 
Collective defense means maintaining the Alliance’s political cohesion and 
military capabilities to deter coercion and aggression and, if necessary, to 
conduct military operations to restore the security and integrity of the territory 
protected by the alliance commitments. Collective security concepts call upon 
aspirations for universally shared responsibility for peace and international 
order…2 
                                                                 




Membership in the Alliance became a top foreign policy and security priority for 
emerging governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe. These countries viewed 
membership in NATO both as a means to guarantee their territorial integrity and security as well 
as a way to promote democracy and give impetus to institutional, social and military changes 
that were required to meet membership criteria.  
NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its 
members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter. The Alliance has worked since its inception for the 
establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe based on common 
values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This central Alliance 
objective has taken on renewed significance since the end of the Cold War 
because, for the first time in the post war – history of Europe, the prospect of its 
achievement has become a reality.3 
 
In addition, “NATO, in particular, has sought to stabilize post-communist democracies, 
expanded its membership and sphere of influence, promoted a special relationship with Russia, 
and helped manage Balkan security – to list just a few of its activities.”4 
The Republic of Bulgaria is one of Eastern European countries that overthrew a 
communist regime and established a viable democracy. While Bulgaria recognizes the need for 
stronger security guarantees because of its size and the geopolitics of the region, it sees NATO 
membership not only as a provider of security guarantees but as a way to ensure the continued 
evolution and consolidation of democracy as well. Additionally, the country desires to embrace 
                                                                 
3 NATO Handbook, Chapter I, What is NATO (Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 1998-1999), p.23 
4 Sean Key, NATO and the Future of European Security (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p.1-2. 
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the European and Trans-Atlantic values with NATO being the best vehicle to promote these 
values and relations.  
Because of the political reshuffling that took place in Bulgaria after 1989, the country 
did not always have a consistent policy towards the membership issue. The first practical steps 
to this end were taken in 1997 when the current government of the Union of Democratic Forces 
came into power. 
Although Bulgaria was not extended an invitation during the last round of Enlargement, 
the country’s leadership continued efforts to meet membership criteria in anticipation of the next 
round by actively participating in relevant activities to include the Partnership for Peace and the 
Individual Partnership Program (IPP).  
Bulgaria, through its actions, has shown that it would make a credible and reliable 
NATO member, who is not only willing to receive but generate security as well. Bulgaria’s 
assistance to NATO operations in the 1998-1999 Kosovo crisis clearly demonstrates its efforts 
at increasing the confidence and security in the Balkans. These recent contributions in support of 
NATO demonstrate that the Bulgarian membership would be mutually beneficial. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
 This thesis is based on an analytical survey of primary and secondary sources 
addressing the steps NATO has undertaken in response to the security needs of the new 
Central and Eastern European democracies. This work focuses on the initial idea of NATO 
membership and its evolution within the Bulgarian political scene. The thesis concentrates on the 
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progress Bulgaria has accomplished in its quest for membership since 1997 when the UDF 
government came into power and commenced serious efforts to this end. It examines the points 
of view of leading US experts on NATO concerning Bulgaria’s place in the Alliance and the 
stance of the Bulgarian decision-makers on the membership issue. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II summarizes the character of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, developments 
after 1989, and provides a detailed account of the concrete measures NATO has taken since 
the 1990s in implementing its new collective security roles associated with Central and East 
European countries. Chapter III addresses the internal political implications of Bulgaria’s quest 
for NATO membership. It examines the country’s efforts to meet the membership requirements 
and its contributions to stability and peace in the region. Chapter IV delineates the major 
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II. NATO FACES THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Western European nations were economically devastated and militarily weak as a result 
of Second World War. These nations felt threatened by the Soviet Union, which in contrast had 
emerged from the war militarily stronger. 
The Soviet Union maintained approximately thirty divisions in Eastern Europe, 
including nine tank and eleven motorized infantry divisions. Western intelligence 
estimates concluded that in the immediate postwar years, the Soviet Union had 
some five million men in the armed forces, with 175 divisions in the western 
Soviet Union and another 125 divisions in strategic reserve.5 
 
  The Soviet presence was further consolidated through a number of communist regimes 
installed in East European countries. 
Britain concluded a military alliance with France, known as the Treaty of Dunkirk, in 
1947.6 While the primary purpose of this alliance was to prevent future German aggression, it 
also provided for economic assistance and military cooperation against the political threat of 
other potential aggressors, specifically Russia. 
The Prague Coup of February 1948 served to reinforce Europe’s fear of the Russian 
threat. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, immediately called for greater economic and military 
co-operation among western European countries. Thus in 1948 the Treaty of Dunkirk was 
                                                                 
5 Ibid., p.13. 
6 Ibid., p.14. 
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expanded to include the Benelux countries, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, and 
became the Treaty of Brussels. This Treaty was both a military and an ideological alliance, 
providing for collective self-defence and economic and social collaboration in Western Europe. 
These five nations grew increasingly suspicious of Russian intentions following the Berlin 
Blockade. Additionally, the United States wanted to find allies in Europe to contain communist 
expansion. 
On 4 April 1949 twelve nations - the United States, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, 
Norway, Portugal, Italy, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg -signed the 
North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C.  
The primary reason for NATO’s founding was the Soviet challenge in Eastern 
Europe. NATO was an alliance created in response to a threat. As Charles 
Bohlen wrote in his memoirs: ’Our participation in the North Atlantic Treaty 
arrangement was entirely due to Soviet policy and power…Had the Soviet 
Union not chosen to prevent the unification of Germany in 1947 and 1948, 
there would have been no North Atlantic Treaty.’7   
 
The partners of the Treaty believed that Russian Communism, an anti-democratic 
ideology, posed a new threat to the democratic world and stated that "an armed attack against 
one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all."8 In the event of such an 
attack they promised to take whatever action deemed necessary to ensure the preservation of 
peace and their civilized way of life. This Treaty served to draw together western European 
nations under American leadership. The establishment of NATO as an essential defensive 
                                                                 
7 Ibid., p.31. 
8 The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5. 
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organization against Communist aggression was an initial and important step in developing 
European and Trans-Atlantic cooperation.  
In response to the formation of NATO, the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact, 
named after the city where the satellites of the Soviet Union signed a multilateral Treaty on 
Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance in May 1955. This Treaty was almost 
identical to the existing bilateral treaties between each country and the Soviet Union. The 
Warsaw Pact was comprised of the communist states in Europe – the Soviet Russia, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany – with the exception 
of Yugoslavia. The Pact spoke of peaceful intentions and defense. The Treaty assured its 
members of immediate assistance to include the use of armed force in the event of aggression 
and, therefore, precluded their participation in any other coalition or alliance. To provide for 
military assistance, a Russian Supreme Commander was appointed to lead the combined armed 
forces of the Pact. 
The formation of a legally defined, multilateral alliance organization also 
reinforced the Soviet Union's claim to power status as the leader of the world 
socialist system, enhanced its prestige, and legitimized its presence and influence 
in Eastern Europe. However, as events inside the Soviet alliance developed, this 
initial external impetus for the formation of the Warsaw Pact lost its importance, 
and the Soviet Union found a formal alliance useful for other purposes. The 
Soviet Union created a structure for dealing with its East European allies more 
efficiently when it superimposed the multilateral Warsaw Pact on their existing 
bilateral treaty ties.9 
 
                                                                 
9 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1992, Country studies,  Available [Online]:< 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/appnc.html, [24 January 2001] 
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For four decades the two organizations co-existed, counterbalanced each other, and 
developed politically and militarily. With the collapse of communist regimes throughout Central 
and Eastern Europe in 1989, the Organization of the Warsaw Pact became irrelevant, resulting 
in its death. Since “it was a permanent Soviet article of faith to link the future of the Warsaw 
Pact with NATO’s”10 a number of Soviet senior officials believed that NATO would soon 
follow suit.  
During the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in 1989-91, 
prominent Soviet officials expressed confidence that NATO itself would soon 
fade away as well. Eduard Shevardnadze, then the Soviet foreign minister, 
declared in September 1990 that ‘in the future NATO and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization will become component parts of all-European security structures 
and later will probably be dissolved in them.’11 
 
The Soviet ideologists were mistaken in their forecasts due to their supposition that did 
not take into account a number of factors.  The most important of these factors was the failure 
to recognize the real character of NATO, an organization comprised of willing members. Unlike 
the Warsaw Pact, which was based on a superpower leader controlling satellite members, 
NATO was built upon the premises of voluntary communication between democratic states in 
Europe and North America. As Thomas Risse – Kappen, the joint International Relations Chair 
at the Department of Political and Social Sciences and the Robert Schuman Center at the 
European University Institute in Florence, Italy, describes: 
                                                                 
10 Gerald B. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate 1990-1997(Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington, D.C, 1998), p.6. 
11 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p.27. 
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NATO provides a unique institutional framework for the Europeans to affect 
American policies. As I argue in this book, liberal democracies successfully 
influence each other in the framework of international institutions by using norms 
and joint decisions-making procedures as well as transnational politics. Playing 
by the rules of these institutions, they do not just constrain their own freedom of 
action, but they also gain access to the decision - making processes of their 
partners.12 
 
The Soviets underestimated the importance of NATO’s achievements and past 
successes in keeping it from disbanding. “The unprecedented degrees of institutionalized 
cooperation, consultation, and politico-military integration that formed the core of the alliance’s 
vast network of transnational links were not to be discarded lightly. NATO, then, was a form of 
insurance that guaranteed a measure of continuing influence and security for its member 
states.”13 
In the immediate aftermath of 1989, while there was some questioning as to the future 
role of NATO, the Alliance did not disintegrate. Rather, it quickly managed to adapt to the new 
realities and found appropriate mechanisms to address the security needs of the new 
democracies, becoming the most viable guarantor of European stability. 
NATO’s leaders led by the Americans, envisaged a day when political Europe, 
united by shared values and stabilized and protected by the transatlantic link 
embodied in NATO, would more closely resemble its geographical entity. 
NATO projected itself as the guardian of pan-European security, committed to 
the creation of a stable and prosperous environment for its former adversaries, 
as well as for its members.14 
 
                                                                 
12 Thomas Risse – Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies (Princeton University Press, 1995), p.225 
13 Ian Q.Thomas, The Promise of Alliance (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), p.186. 
14 Ibid., p.174. 
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 Risse-Kappen emphasizes that “the end of the cold war not only does not terminate the 
Western community of values, but potentially extends it into Eastern Europe and may be into the 
successor states of the Soviet Union, creating a ‘pacific federation’ (Immanuel Kant) of liberal 
democracies from Vladivostok to Berlin, San Francisco and Tokyo.”15 
B. WHAT NATO HAS DONE 
The 1989 Central and Eastern European revolutions brought changes in the security 
environment. The 1990s witnessed a number of events that influenced not only the security of 
that part of the globe but of the world as a whole. The German unification in 1990, the 
withdrawal of Soviet Groups of Forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1991 and the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact in mid-1991 are the most important events of this kind. In 1992 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated. In 1993 Czechoslovakia divided peacefully, 
and, thus, the number of the European states was increased by one. NATO emerged as the 
backbone of Europe’s security architecture but at the same time was challenged by these 
events. Despite the rapid pace of historical events in the 1990s, as if history had been fast-
forwarded, NATO was successful in meeting emerging challenges. The Alliance initially 
responded to the developments in East Germany, then to the former Warsaw Pact members of 
Central and Eastern Europe, and to the new states emerging as a result of the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union. 
                                                                 
15 Thomas Risse – Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies (Princeton University Press, 1995), p.223. 
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NATO reacted to the events of 1989 by extending a hand of friendship to six former 
Warsaw Pact members - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet 
Union - at the London Summit in July 1990. NATO invited these countries to visit Brussels and 
address the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Alliance further extended an invitation to these 
governments to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO and to intensify military contacts 
during this period of historic change.16  NATO also stated its determination to protect peace 
and construct “ a Europe whole and free.”17 
In the words of NATO’s London Declaration, ’We need to keep standing 
together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. 
Yet our alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the 
structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the 
strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes.18 
 
In November 1991 at the Rome NAC Summit, NATO approved the Rome 
Declaration, which provided for broadening interaction with the Soviet Union and the Central 
and East European countries. The Alliance created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC), building upon the existing NAC, and initiated another major change in adopting the 
New Strategic Concept, replacing its 1967 strategy of "Flexible Response."19 As to the 
character and substance of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council: 
                                                                 
16 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion  (Institute for National 
Strategic Studies), Available [Online]:< file://C:\WINNT\Temporary, [13 November 2000] 
17 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p.73. 
18 Ibid., p.73. 
19 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion (Institute for National 
Strategic Studies), Available [Online]:< file://C:\WINNT\Temporary, [13November 2000] 
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An American initiative, the NACC was a new ‘institutional relationship of 
consultation and cooperation on political and security issues’ open to all former 
(and newly independent) members of the Warsaw Pact. The NACC states 
began extensive consultation on issues including national defense planning, 
principles and key aspects of strategy, force and command structures, military 
exercises, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, civil/military 
coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defense 
production to civilian purposes.20 
 
 In December 1991 the foreign ministers of the "former adversaries"21 and newly 
independent Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia met with NATO representatives for an inaugural 
NACC meeting and adopted a "Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation." This 
statement endorsed annual meetings of the NACC at the ministerial level, bimonthly meetings of 
the NAC with liaison ambassadors, additional NACC meetings when circumstances warranted, 
and regular meetings of the Political, Economic and Military Committees with liaison partners. 
The purpose of the cooperation was security-related issues. In February 1992 the NACC met 
at the level of ambassadors to discuss and adopt a "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership, and 
Cooperation." In March of the same year at an Extraordinary NACC meeting the number of 
members was increased to thirty-five by including the Former Soviet Republics with the 
exception of Georgia. Later the number of NACC members was increased to thirty-eight. 
 In late 1993 the United States proposed to NATO Allies the Partnership for Peace 
program which is outreaching to the East, going beyond NACC and focusing on defense and 
                                                                 
20 Sean Key, NATO and the Future of European Security (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p.66. 
21 Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion (Institute for National 
Strategic Studies) Available [Online]:< file://C:\WINNT\Temporary, [13 November 2000]  
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military cooperation. The goals and purposes of the PfP program were defined in the North 
Atlantic Council Declaration: 
At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual 
participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in 
defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint 
planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO 
forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian 
operations, and others as may be agreed.22 
 
 At the January 1994 NATO Brussels Summit the heads of state and governments 
agreed to the PfP program and invited other European states, members of NACC or the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to join. Although the former 
Warsaw Pact countries saw PfP as a compromise that held out the prospect for NATO 
expansion they recognized that some relationship had to be worked out with Russia. In addition 
NATO states, Parliaments, and publics needed to give greater consideration to the whole 
NATO expansion issue before making a decision.23 This forum resulted in adopting the 
Combined Joint Task Forces, a commitment to future expansion of the Alliance, and approval 
of the European Security and Defense Identity. 
 At that Summit a "Partnership for Peace: Invitation and Framework Document" was 
issued. In that document NATO leaders outlined the PfP program and declared their 
commitment to enhance the security and stability in Europe. 
                                                                 
22 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p.97. 
23 James W.Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments (National Defense 
University), Available[Online]:< file://C:\WINNT\Temporary, [13 November 2000] 
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This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability 
and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation 
and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through 
democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership.24 
 
The ministers addressed the NATO expansion issue and reaffirmed that the Alliance, in 
compliance with article X, is open to new members. The Alliance leaders emphasized that the 
active participation in the PfP process is an important prerequisite to the evolutionary process of 
NATO expansion. The then-NATO Secretary General, Willy Claes highlights the three stages 
of the PfP process: the country signs the PfP framework agreement, presents its ideas for an 
Individual Partnership Program and during the third stage the proposals are examined by 
NATO and the respective PfP country.25 Initially the fashioning of PfP was accompanied by 
certain skepticism. Despite the claims that the Partnership initiative was yet another way to 
postpone the accommodation of the newly independent countries into NATO throughout the 
years PfP proved to be a flexible and efficient mechanism.“In Walter Slocombe’s words, ‘by 
creating the Partnership for Peace, NATO has done more than just building the basis for 
enlargement. It is in fact creating a new zone of security and stability throughout Europe.’”26 
                                                                 
24 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed, Appendix 2:Partnership for Peace: Framework Document” (United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p.309. 
25 James W.Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments (National Defense 
University), Available [Online]:< file://C:\WINNT\Temporary, [13 November 2000]  
26 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p.155. 
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The Alliance expansion issue started to gain momentum as early as the 1994 NATO 
Brussels Summit. Later that same year President Clinton said: "NATO expansion is no longer a 
question of whether, but when and how."27 
 By early 1995, twenty-five states of CEE, Western Europe and Eurasia joined NATO's 
sixteen members as PfP partners and commenced military cooperation. Some PfP countries 
presented their Individual Partnership Programs and sent their representatives to work at 
NATO Headquarters in Brussels and the PfP Coordination Cell at NATO Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. 
 In addition, in 1995 NATO decided to first answer the questions of "how" and "why" 
should the Alliance expand before answering the question of "who" and "when" will join it. To 
that end a study within the organization was initiated and the answers were formulated in the 
1995 Study on NATO Enlargement.28 The Study gave an explicit answer to the question “why” 
Enlargement and highlighted the Enlargement’s characteristics: 
It will encourage and support democratic reforms, including the establishment of 
civilian and democratic control over the military forces. It will foster the patterns 
and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which 
characterize relations among the current Allies and will promote good-
neighborly relations in the whole Euro-Atlantic area.29 
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 The Study referred to Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, through which the 
accession of new members is done, explaining “how” the Enlargement would proceed.30 
Related, “the Study made clear that willingness and ability to meet such commitments, not only 
on paper but in practice, would be a critical factor in any decision taken by the Alliance to invite 
a country to join.”31 
 The questions of "who" and "when" were formally answered at the 1997 NATO 
Summit in Madrid in what is called "the first round "of post-Cold War enlargement.32 The Allies 
invited the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to begin talks, sign the accession protocols in 
December 1997 and complete the ratification processes in time by the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Alliance in April 1999. By extending these invitations the Alliance contributed to the Eastern 
European security. In 1997 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote: “Now the new 
NATO can do for Europe's east what the old NATO did for Europe's west: vanquish old 
hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in 
the region where two world wars and the cold war began.”33 
 The 1997 NATO Madrid Summit marked a watershed moment in the history of the 
Alliance. By inviting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to start accession talks NATO 
made a practical step aimed at reinforcing peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. This fact 
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was indicative of the progress and depth of the internal and external adaptation of the Alliance. 
The “open door” policy announced at the Summit gave hopes and impetus to those who were 
not invited to become NATO members in that round. 
According to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, ’Central and East European 
states not included in the first round of new members will not be isolated and 
will be able to continue to prepare for membership if they wish to. The first new 
members will not be the last. No aspirant nation will be excluded from 
continuing to work towards membership.34 
 
The Summit introduced the enhanced PfP and a second Planning and Review Process 
(PARP) cycle that made the PfP process more relevant and operational. 
The enhancement of PfP is an integral part of the external adaptation of the 
Alliance. Together with the special relationships which are developed between 
the Alliance and Russia and the alliance and Ukraine, it is helping to set the 
stage for new enhanced security arrangements for Europe.35 
 
The enhanced PfP has a broad spectrum of cooperation areas to include air defense 
related matters; airspace management/control; civil emergency planning; consultation, command 
and control (plus communications and information systems); crisis management; defense 
planning and budgeting; defense policy and strategy; democratic control of forces and defense 
structures; language training; military geography.36  
 Of note, the role of the partners in the PfP decision-making and planning process was 
strengthened. In addition to managing the PfP programs the Political Military Steering 
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Committee became responsible for the Partner Work Program (PWP) and the Individual 
Partner Programs (IPP). Aiming to help the partners plan military exercises and develop PWP 
and PARP interoperability objectives NATO increased the number of Standardized 
Agreements to 1,169.37  
This Summit also marked the creation of the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council 
and NATO-Ukraine Commission. 
That year the NACC was replaced by an organization including all PfP and NACC 
participants. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was established with the aim of 
creating an inclusive institution where topics related to peacekeeping; scientific and 
environmental cooperation, arms control verification and the conversion of defense industries 
could be discussed. 
The EAPC’s founders, the NACC members and PfP Partners, declared that its 
establishment would be ‘a qualitative step forward in raising to a new level the 
dynamic and multifaceted political and military cooperation’ already achieved in 
NACC and PfP, and that it would ‘make a strong contribution to cooperative 
approaches to security and form an enduring part of the European security 
structure.’38 
 
EAPC’s function that “provides for increased involvement of Partner-countries in 
decision-making relating to activities in which they participate”39 is important for the Partner 
countries. 
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The 1999 NATO Washington Summit that commemorated the 50th anniversary of the 
creation of the Alliance, introduced programs to make PfP more operational and approved the 
new Alliance Strategic Concept. To improve the interoperability among the Alliance forces and 
where possible between the Alliance and partner forces the organization launched a Defense 
Capability Initiative. 
Another important NATO tool is the Defense Capability Initiative. NATO has 
thus moved away from the merely diplomatic to being more involved with the 
MAP partners’ force planning process. Some MAP partners actually see the 
DCI as leading to a de facto (vice de jure) operational Article 5.40 
 
In addition NATO introduced a third PARP cycle and Membership Action Plan aimed 
to establish closer relations among the partners and the Alliance and manifest its Open Door 
policy. The enhanced PARP is similar to the planning procedures among the Allies. The PARP 
Ministerial guidance sets partner target force goals to build capabilities and enables partner 
support elements to be involved in exercise planning.41  Additionally, “beginning in 1999, 
NATO approved PARP Ministerial Guidance (now like the DPQ) that replaced the old 
interoperability objectives with partnership Goals (PG) for Interoperability and for Forces and 
Capabilities. The new guidance aimed to develop specific armed forces and capabilities that 
partners could offer in support of NATO operations.”42 
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The importance of MAP was twofold. The MAP “went further than the 1995 Study on 
NATO Enlargement in defining what the aspirants needed to accomplish on the ‘path’ to 
membership. It was designed to incorporate lessons learned in the accession discussions with 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.”43 
The MAPs of the Partner countries identify five activity areas to include political and 
economic, defense/military, resources, security, and legal issues.44 These activity areas 
contribute to the development of the necessary for membership capabilities. Each Partner 
generates a MAP Annual National Plan (ANP). The ANP incorporates the Partner’s objectives 
and targets aimed at future membership. The MAP includes a feedback mechanism through a 
NAC 19 +1 Partner progress assessment, which serves as a clearing house to coordinate 
security assistance and enhanced defense planning, and establishes and reviews the approved 
planning targets.45  
Jeffrey Simon, leading US government official on PfP, Senior Fellow at the Institute for 
National Strategic Studies states: ”In fact, one might argue that the MAPs comprehensive 
program has created the necessary “NATO acqui” against which the alliance can assess the 
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nine MAP partner’s technical preparation and capacities and judge readiness for 
membership.”46 
Based on the Alliance capabilities for further Enlargement and the willingness of the 
countries to pursue membership or remain within the PfP framework the Washington Summit 
differentiated between the twenty-four partner countries. These countries were divided into nine 
MAP and fifteen non-MAP states. 
Today the aspirant countries can only second guess as to what the future steps of 
NATO would be in dealing with the Central and Eastern European countries. Of note, some 
suppositions of analysts and experts in that field are encouraging. In his latest article “The Next 
Round of NATO Enlargement” Simon predicts: 
The next NATO Summit scheduled for 2002 will have enlargement on its 
agenda, not just because the April 1999 Washington Summit stated that the 
next Summit would review the enlargement process, but also because the nine 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) foreign ministers launched a political initiative 
on May 18-19, 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, to remind the member states of 
NATO "to fulfill the promise of the Washington Summit to build a Europe whole 
and free…[and] at the next NATO Summit in 2002 to invite our democracies 
to join NATO.47 
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III. BULGARIA IN A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
A. WHAT HAS BULGARIA DONE 
 Bulgaria, a small country located in the Balkans, on the border of Asiatic Turkey and 
across the Black Sea from the Russian and Soviet Empires, has always been under strong 
political influence from both east and west. 
After finally regaining its independence at the end of the nineteenth century, 
modern Bulgaria stood in the shadow of European power politics through the 
first nine decades of the twentieth century. In that period, three successive 
major geopolitical antagonisms largely determined Bulgaria’s place in the world: 
the Ottoman Empire versus Slavic Europe, the Axis powers versus the Allies, 
then the Warsaw Pact opposing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.48 
 
On 3 March 1878 under the Treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria was liberated from a five 
century Turkish yoke. This Treaty provided for an autonomous Bulgarian state bordering the 
Black and Aegean seas. Four months later Britain and Austria-Hungary, concerned that the new 
state would extend the Russian influence into the Balkans, reshaped the Treaty of San Stefano 
into the Treaty of Berlin. According to the Treaty of Berlin the territory of Bulgaria would be 
one third of the originally prescribed by the Treaty of San Stefano with Macedonia and Thrace 
reverted to Otoman control and Eastern Rumelia staying under Turkish rule, but with a Christian 
governor.49 The large Bulgarian populations remaining in these territories, outside the new state, 
caused resentment endured into the next century. 
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Because the West, particularly Great Britain, played a significant role in carving 
up the Balkans, and Bulgaria in particular, in hopes of curbing Russian power, 
many historians speculate that Bulgaria’s alliances with Germany in both World 
I and World War II were products of irredentist sentiment that grew out of the 
Treaty of Berlin.50 
 
In 1878 Bulgaria easily managed to establish its government, which accomplished a 
degree of stability in the aftermath of Turkish rule. The Turnovo Constitution of 1879 
established an advanced and democratic system.51 Additionally, the monarchy that lasted from 
the 1880s until WW II was established. The Turnovo Assembly elected “Alexander of 
Batenberg, a nephew of the tsar who had participated in the campaign of 1877-78, but also a 
German prince, son of an Austrian general, and related to the British royal family. He thus 
reflected accurately in his person the interests of the great powers.”52 In that period Bulgaria 
managed to sufficiently boost up the economy of the country, raise the living standards of the 
population and take steps to improve education and culture.  
As it turned out, the years 1886 to 1912 formed the only prolonged period of 
peaceful development that Bulgaria was to enjoy. Between 1912 and 1944, 
Bulgaria participated in two local conflicts and two world wars.53 
 
Although by 1912 Bulgaria had primarily devoted itself to domestic problems, the fate 
of the Bulgarians remaining under Turkish rule was an important consideration. Eastern and 
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Western Thrace as well as Macedonia had sizeable Bulgarian population and important 
economic and strategic advantages. The territory of Macedonia was the most highly disputed by 
all the Balkan states  
The tumultuous history of Macedonia set the stage for the two Balkan wars. In 
1912, at the onset of the First Balkan War, Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and 
Greece formed an alliance to drive the Turks from Europe. Turkey, who was at 
war with Italy at the time, was weak and disunited. Macedonia and Thrace 
were hotbeds of internal disorder.54 
 
The defeat of the Turks in the First Balkan War did not result in settlement of the 
Macedonian issue. Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria had claims to the land. A partial solution was 
found through a compromise between Bulgaria and Serbia according to which the northern 
section went to Serbia, while the eastern was given to Bulgaria.55  This compromise did not last 
long. 
In 1913 the Second Balkan war began, the Greeks, Montenegrins, Serbs and 
Romanians joining forces with their previous enemy, the Turks, against their 
former ally, the Bulgarians. This rivalry had been fostered by both Austria and 
Russia. Eventually, the Bulgarians turned to the Russians for arbitration and 
finally signed a mutual defense treaty with Russia.56 
 
In 1913 Bulgaria’s fights on two fronts made it weak and the country had to surrender. 
As a result of the Second Balkan War Bulgaria was given a very small portion of Macedonia. 
The participation of Bulgaria in WW I was another attempt to solve the Macedonian 
issue. The major political players in Bulgaria were divided whether Bulgaria should align itself 
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with the Entente (Russia, France and Britain) or should join the Central Powers (Austria-
Hungary and Germany).57  In October 1915 Bulgaria, lured by the territorial offers of the 
Central Powers, signed a secret treaty with them and entered the war.58 
Bulgaria, of all the Balkan states, was the only one to join the Central Powers, 
led by Germany and Austria, in World war I. It was deeply ironic that Bulgaria 
chose to side with her former enemy and oppressor, Turkey, and against her 
former friend and protector, Russia.59 
 
In spite of some success early in the war, Bulgaria and the Central Powers were 
defeated. Bulgaria had to give up the idea of regaining Macedonia and Thrace and cope with a 
complicated situation aggravated by external fighting and internal division. 
Under the Treaty of Neuilly – sur – Seine in November 1919, Bulgaria lost part 
of western Thrace to Greece and some small territories on its western frontier to 
Yugoslavia. His left Bulgaria with a small net gain, chiefly on its southern 
frontier, but it was so slight in terms of expectations and costs that the wars of 
1912-18 have come to be regarded as a national catastrophe.60 
 
The period between the two World wars, characterized by uneasy political coalitions, 
slow economic growth, and re-emerging of the Macedonian problem,61 was difficult for 
Bulgaria 
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Bulgaria entered World War II, as it was the case with World War I, because of the 
Macedonian question. This time it aligned itself and fought on the losing German side. 
In December 1941 Bulgaria placed herself squarely on the German side by 
declaring war on Great Britain and the United States and joining the Rome-
Berlin Axis…. Despite the declaration of war against Great Britain and the 
United States, Bulgaria refused throughout World War II to declare war on the 
Soviet Union…. When Germany declared war on Russia, Bulgaria continued to 
retain neutrality toward, and to maintain diplomatic relations with, the Soviet 
Union.62 
 
Bulgaria siding with the wrong allies lost this war as well. The country’s attempts to 
release itself from the Alliance failed. The war ended on 4 September 1944 with the Soviets 
entering Bulgaria. The communists came into power in 1944 and ruled the country until 1989. 
Although in the minority, the communists had been the driving force in forming 
the coalition as an underground resistance organization in 1942. The presence 
of the Red Army, which remained in Bulgaria until 1947, strengthened 
immeasurably the communist position in dealing with the Allies and rival factions 
in the coalition.63 
 
WW II did not settle the Macedonian issue in favor of Bulgaria either. As a result of this 
war Bulgaria gained Southern Dobruja and aligned itself with the Soviet Union and the other 
communist countries. 
During the Cold War Bulgaria sought national security guarantees through membership 
in the Organization of the Warsaw Pact. The seven participating countries in the Warsaw Pact 
were united solely by communist ideology. 
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During the communist period (1944-1989), ‘The Soviet Union’s Most Loyal 
Ally whose clock was set on Moscow time’ was only too willing to identify 
national security with the systemic security of the Moscow-led association of the 
Warsaw Treaty states united by a common ideology. The Kremlin imposed an 
obligation upon each of the member states to defend and strengthen the 
ideological system of real existing socialism, with no regard for intrinsic 
considerations of national security per se.64 
 
The events at the end of 1989 and early 1990 marked the beginning of Central and East 
European states democratization The democratically elected governments were no longer willing 
to associate their security, political, and economic development with membership in the existing 
socialist security and cooperation structures. 
 After the dissolution of the bipolar model Europe was divided into four zones with 
different level of security. Bulgaria and the other countries from Central and Eastern Europe as 
well as the former Soviet Republics belonged to the so-called “grey zone”65 of security. In 
addition “with the collapse of the USSR, Warsaw Pact, and Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, Bulgaria lost its allies, the protective Soviet umbrella, indeed all guarantees for its 
security – and this in a much troubled and highly volatile region of the world.”66 
 Bulgaria apart from facing the common for the post-communist countries security 
“vacuum” had to cope with problems resulting from the regional conflict in its immediate 
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neighborhood. Because of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Bulgaria had to settle three major groups 
of concerns: conflict spill over, eventual refugee or immigration flow from the zones of the 
conflict, and possible negative identification from the point of view of choice of civilization 
values.  
 Looking for national security guarantees Bulgaria had to choose between three options: 
to continue to be strategically undetermined, to select neutrality, or anticipate NATO 
membership. The country could afford to be strategically undetermined only for a short period 
of time since this position does not provide a permanent solution of the national security 
problems. Neutrality preconditions are a developed economy and abundance of resources for 
support of the political independence. Bulgaria had neither of those so neutrality was not a 
viable scenario in her case. Neutrality further results in an increased isolationism. Apart from 
security guarantees Bulgaria needed integration and cooperation, which could only be provided 
through membership in NATO. 
 The attitude and undertakings aimed at relations with NATO were influenced by the 
events unfolding in the domestic arena. The period 1989-1997 was characterized by a serious 
political reshuffling with governments coming into power and quickly resigning. Within seven 
years Bulgaria had one communist, two socialist, one democratic, three expert caretaker 
governments and three Parliaments. Throughout most of the time the democratically elected 
President had to work with representatives of different political parties, some of which were 
strongly against the idea of NATO membership.67 Bulgaria had an inconsistent policy to NATO 
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membership because of differences in political stance and ideas of the major institutions. In 
1997 for the first time in the new Bulgarian history President, Prime Minister and Parliamentary 
majority represent one and the same political party with shared values and ideas. This unanimity 
gives impetus to the country’s quest for membership in the Alliance.68 
 In the beginning of the 1990s the relations with NATO became a criteria for political 
alignment of Central and East European countries. As a result in Bulgaria the membership issue 
was highly politicized within the realm of domestic life. While the political elite was unanimous 
that the country should integrate into the European Community (later on the European Union) as 
soon as possible, the question of NATO membership did not enjoy such a consensus. All 
governments after 1990 declared as their major foreign policy priority the integration of Bulgaria 
into the Euro-Atlantic structures, but at the same time the political parties interpreted and 
realized that goal in different ways. Some political parties and their governments did not 
consider NATO as a tool for Euro-Atlantic cooperation. Instead, these governments paid much 
more attention and strengthened the relations with the other outreaching institution the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Although the initial steps towards 
establishing relations with NATO were undertaken as early as the tenure of the Great National 
Assembly,69 the lack of consensus on the membership issue became clear. The first who 
initiated undertakings to this end were the Union of Democratic Forces deputies Solomon Passi 
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(later President of Atlantic Club – Bulgaria) and Ljubomir Ivanov, as well as the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party deputy Dragomir Draganov. In August 1990 Solomon Passi appealed to the 
Great National Assembly to commence work for the integration of the country into NATO 
structures. On 23 August that year Passi delivered a speech in the Bulgarian Parliament, stating:  
The obvious trend of the political processes inherently points out, that it is high 
time for Bulgaria to take a very good care of its defense by both looking for 
more and reliable allies, as well as few and smaller eventual enemies. Bulgaria’s 
military and political membership in NATO would accelerate the natural 
processes, would provide a new and unprecedented security on the Balkans 
and the strongest guarantees for peace and good relations with its four 
neighbors as well as a mighty impetus for the economic and informational 
integration with United Europe. Think, honorable senators, think!70 
 
The idea for NATO membership was gaining momentum. In November 1990 five 
deputies, representing different political groups, visited NATO HQ. According to Dr. Zhelev71, 
these deputies were the first ever Parliamentarians from Eastern Europe to visit Brussels. The 
deputies met NATO Secretary General Manfred Vjorner and had a lively and interesting 
exchange with him. As a result of that meeting the deputies decided to establish Atlantic Club 
Bulgaria upon the return back home. Throughout the years Atlantic Club-Bulgaria became one 
of the most efficient non-governmenmtal organizations in promoting the Euro-Atlantic ideas and 
values. 
 Related, in Bulgaria 135 deputies strongly supported the idea of Bulgaria’s candidacy 
for NATO membership. To that end they drafted a Memorandum, which had to be approved 
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by the Great National Assembly. Although the draft of the Memorandum was twice on the 
agenda of the Great National Assembly, it was never discussed in a plenary session. In 
December that year the initiative for NATO membership was handed over to the National 
Security Committee. 72 
 The cornerstone document in the relations between Bulgaria and NATO is the National 
Assembly Declaration on NATO, dated 21 December 1993. Through this Declaration the 
Parliament requires from the Bulgarian Government to power up and add substance to the 
cooperation between Bulgaria and NATO, taking into account the national interests of the 
country. The Declaration’s ponderous language and style reflect the difficult compromise 
between the political parties, but outline the political framework for the executive power, aimed 
at achieving membership. From 1994 until 1997 Bulgaria built upon this Declaration and 
became an active participant in PfP. 
 As a result of the efficient exchange and efforts of both the country and the Alliance on 
14 February 1994 in NATO HQ, Brussels, the then President of Bulgaria Dr. Zhelju Zhelev, 
signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document. Bulgaria joined the big family of PfP 
countries and started the process of getting to know the Alliance.  
The Individual Partnership Program between the Republic of Bulgaria and NATO is the 
major planning document for co-operation in the framework of Partnership for Peace. The IPP 
was developed on the basis of the Partnership Working Programme, approved by NATO and 
                                                                 




covering a 3-year period of time. It included the proposals of the Republic of Bulgaria, the 
bilateral co-operation programs between Bulgaria and NATO nations and other PfP Partners. 
In November 1994, the first Individual Partnership Programme between the Republic of 
Bulgaria and NATO that included activities in twenty-two areas of co-operation was 
approved.73 
In February 1995, the Republic of Bulgaria joined the first cycle of the Planning and 
Review Process by submitting to NATO HQ a PfP Overall Interoperability Survey comprising 
of eighteen Interoperability Objectives (IOs). An Individual Assessment was elaborated on the 
basis of the Overall Interoperability Survey. At the beginning of that year Bulgaria was among 
the first to send its liaison officers to NATO HQ and the Partnership Coordination Center in 
Mons, Belgium when they were open for Partner countries. In addition, Bulgaria was active in 
hosting and participating in PfP exercises. Despite the hard work of the military the politicians 
ruined the country’s achievements. With the socialist government of Zhan Videnov coming into 
power in 1995 the foreign policy of the country suffered a draw back. Of note, ”the ideologues 
[of the socialist party] pay lip service to the idea of a united Europe, but are staunchly anti-
Western and never miss a chance to vent animosity toward NATO.”74 
The 1995-1996 Bulgarian socialist government could not disguise its negative attitude to 
NATO membership. This particular attitude had negative impact on the European and Euro-
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Atlantic integration of the country. Bulgaria was the only post-communist country whose 
government refused to apply for full NATO membership.  
Bulgaria’s ex-communist government was at odds with reformist and pro-
NATO president Zhelyu Zhelev and did not apply for NATO membership until 
1997. Bulgaria was also interested in mutual consultations and expressed 
particular attention to reciprocity and dialogue before decisions were taken. 
Because it had little interest in peacekeeping and in any case could not, as a 
neighboring state, participate in former Yugoslavia, its priority was getting on 
with nuts-and-bolts issues such as access to interoperability information.75  
 
This refusal resulted in foreign policy isolation of the government and the country. The 
country’s leadership was equivocal expressing its official policy. In a 1995 interview, the then 
Minister of Defense asked whether the Bulgarian MoD would look toward NATO with regard 
to arms sales, replied:  
We will look both toward Russia and NATO. To think that we can avoid 
integration into the European structures is an illusion. On the other hand, Russia 
has been our ally for centuries. The issue is not about being ‘for’ or ‘against’ 
NATO but about he road along which we would march toward NATO. In 
addition, it must be remembered that 95 percent of our weapons are made in 
Russia76     
 
This attitude reads – we want in NATO but we want to maintain our relations with 
Russia as well. 
Prime Minister Zhan Videnov was more ambiguous in his answers during Parliamentary 
hearings when former UDF premier Filip Dimitrov insisted that Bulgaria should clearly and firmly 
state its will for admission to NATO. Videnov articulated the government’s position: 
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Bulgaria will avail itself of every opportunity offered by the North Atlantic 
security and defense structures, so that in the event of their enlargement in the 
future Bulgaria could join them, granted that its national interests are fully 
respected, without trying to build its national security at the expense of third 
countries.77 
 
The parliamentary majority of the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party was postponing all 
plenary debates, related to NATO membership. Instead of undertaking the necessary political 
and diplomatic steps, as the Government was assigned to do, it chose a “wait and see” policy. 
The BSP and its government waited to see how NATO would evolve and transform from a 
defense structure into a security structure and study the proposed criteria and conditions. In 
addition, the government wanted to make sure that NATO was not planning to set up its military 
bases on Bulgarian territory and expected from NATO to regulate its relations with Russia.78 
 These deliberations leave the impression that the BSP did not desire NATO 
membership but was afraid to categorically state its position The Bulgarian opposition and the 
foreign experts were aware that relations with Russia and the Russian influence, which was 
coming back, resulted in that stance. The West saw the Bulgarians as more attached to the 
Russians than any other post-communist country. 
 In addition, the momentum of the practical co-operation in 1995-96 slowed down. The 
political leadership considered the partnership relations and status sufficient for the current 
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moment and in a long-term perspective. For this BSP government the perspective of NATO 
membership was not a priority and was not on the foreign policy agenda. The unclear position 
and controversial signals sent by Bulgaria resulted in unpredictability and discontinuity in the 
relations with the Alliance. The destroyed quality of the partnership influenced negatively the 
preparation for membership, and provoked legitimate doubts in NATO nations about the 
consistency and direction of the Bulgarian foreign policy.79   
 The Alliance did not oppose Bulgaria’s position. As an example in the summer of 1996 
UK Secretary of Defense Michael Portillo visited Bulgaria with the message that Bulgaria would 
be the bridge between NATO and Russia. Although this message fitted well with the ruling 
majority it was not acceptable for the President, who together with Atlantic Club Bulgaria was 
the only institution that consistently worked towards achieving NATO membership. The 
President sometimes sounded desperate by stating that the Bulgarians feel that the West had left 
them in the lurch but he was the most outspoken and out-front promoter of the membership 
idea. He did not miss an opportunity to make Bulgaria’s case. In his speeches, addresses and 
meetings with counterparts and NATO officials the President dwelled upon the country’s 
reasons for NATO membership: it gives political motivation to the will to support democratic 
institutions and to guarantee human rights; Bulgaria does not want to cause new dividing lines in 
Europe, or to become an island standing outside the new European security architecture; 
NATO enlargement will categorically confirm the right of these European democracies to a free 
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choice in the security area; no country outside NATO should be allowed to block or deter  this 
process; Bulgaria does not conceal that it seeks cooperation with and membership in NATO as 
a guarantee for its security; this is also a desire to work with NATO member countries to 
contribute to the joint efforts in the area of economic development, crime prevention, and 
money laundering, which are among the main needs of the new East European democracies.80 
B. TRANSLATING THE WORDS INTO PRACTICE 
 Beginning in late 1996 political fortunes changed and turned against the ruling Socialist 
government. In Bulgaria’s second direct presidential elections of October-November 1996, 
Petar Stoyanov of the Union of Democratic Forces defeated the Socialist party candidate and 
began a five-year term in January 1997. At the end of 1996, mass demonstrations and rallies, 
expressing the discontent of the nation with the BSP domestic, economic and social policy, 
forced the Socialist government to resign and go for early parliamentary elections. A UDF 
caretaker government under Stefan Sofianski immediately took steps to stabilize the economy. 
The elections of April 1997 resulted in victory for the UDF and its coalition partners. For the 
first time in its new history Bulgaria has President, Government and Parliamentary majority 
representing one and the same political party. The new political situation positively influenced the 
quest for NATO membership. The determination and motivation of the country’s efforts for 
membership are summarized by President Petar Stoyanov in his Statement during NAC meeting 
on 29 January 1997: 
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Our firm desire for NATO membership is based on the following premises: first 
Bulgaria’s belonging to the same value system and our readiness to contribute to 
the general security and share the risks of defending and protecting these same 
general values; second, the conviction that a changing NATO will be the 
cornerstone of Euro-atlantic security in the 21 century; third, our desire for 
equal participation in the processes of reform and decision making in the area of 
Trans-atlantic security especially when our region is concerned.81 
 
 Steps to this end were undertaken as early as February 1997. On 17 February, the 
caretaker Government for the first time ever stated Bulgaria’s firm and unequivocal desire for 
membership in the Alliance. The Government circulated a Statement among all NATO member 
countries claiming that Bulgaria wished to be considered and invited to start accession 
negotiations. The Statement referred to the National Assembly Declaration of December 1993, 
which is the only document enjoying broad consensus among the political parties on the 
membership issue.  
In March 1997 the caretaker government approved a National Program for Preparation 
and Accession to NATO and established an Intergovernmental Committee on NATO 
Integration. When the new Bulgarian Government came into power after the April elections it 
reiterated the stance of its predecessor. On 8 May 1997 the National Assembly adopted a 
National Consensus Declaration defining NATO membership as a major national priority. In 
early 1997 the country began an “intensified dialogue” with NATO on prospective membership. 
Bulgaria was active in the work of the EAPC. The Bulgarian Ministry of Defence, an essential 
part of the efforts towards integration, worked hard in the second PARP cycle from 1997 until 
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1999. Forty Iinteroperability Objectives were identified for that second PARP cycle. By 
contrast to the first PARP cycle, the IOs of the second cycle were concrete with a consistent 
implementation timetable. These objectives cover areas such as: command and control 
structure, officers training, particularly in procedures and tactics, air control and air defence, air 
traffic control and transport, movement planning land operations, availability of units, maps and 
symbols, medical support, logistics command, control and supply, logistic sustainability and 
language training. 
In July 1997 at the Madrid NATO Summit, Bulgaria was not invited to join the 
Alliance. The encouraging message was that the North Atlantic Organisation was not closing its 
door for other aspirants willing and able to assume the responsibilities of membership. The 
government did not give up and developed a strategy to be among the countries expected to be 
invited in the next round of Enlargement. The strategy included an intensified dialogue with 
NATO on issues related to membership, reform of the Armed Forces to meet NATO 
standards, active participation in EAPC and PfP, and regional co-operation efforts to reinforce 
stability and security in South Eastern Europe.82 
The President of Bulgaria was in the lead of the undertakings. He was brief but eloquent 
in answering the question “why” when pressing and lobbying for NATO membership:  
This is our civilizational choice. It is deeply motivated and final. It is a cultural 
choice, a strong wish to return to where we belonged 45 years ago and from 
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where we were cut off by force. It is not just to go along with the ‘fashionable 
infatuation.’83 
 
Describing how the Bulgarians, a significant proportion of whom support membership in 
the Alliance, see NATO the President highlighted that to his nation the organization is not only a 
security system. He explained that for the Bulgarians the Alliance represents a set of values to 
include free markets, protection of foreign investment, protection of human rights, and the rule of 
law. In addition Bulgaria considers the membership in the Alliance as a way to express the 
country’s foreign policy orientation; it provides incentive for reforms on the domestic arena, and 
acts as an impetus for modernization.84 
The National Security Concept adopted in April 1998 demonstrates the will of the 
government. This Concept defines membership in NATO and the EU as national priority in 
compliance with the long-term interests of the country. 
The process of integration into NATO and the EU has a positive influence upon 
Bulgarian security. However only full membership in these institutions will 
provide complete guarantees for Bulgaria’s security – this is Bulgaria’s national 
priority.85 
 
Although slowly, Bulgaria was steadily taking the right path. The assessment of 
NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana, who in April 1998 “ found that Bulgaria had 
‘radically changed’ with ‘remarkable progress’ having been made in economic and military 
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reform; he described Bulgaria as ‘a generator of stability in the region’ ”86 is an example of that 
progress.  
Despite the determined and hard work of the new leadership much has to be done. 
Simon's article “Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years,” published in May 1998 helped the 
leadership realize the complicated character of the membership issues. It served as an eye 
opener to the government and gave it food for thought. The article published in NDU’s 
“Strategic Forum” was highly critical to the Socialist government of Bulgaria that hampered the 
country’s relations with NATO. In addition it pointed out the mistakes and mis-perceptions of 
the government that came into power in 1997, as far as membership in the Alliance is 
concerned. The author makes an assessment of Bulgaria’s progress in meeting membership 
criteria such as political reform/democratization, economic reform, treatment of ethnic minorities, 
relations with neighbors, Constitution and Defense Law, Parliamentary oversight, Defense 
Ministry, Military capability and NATO interoperability. The article came up with the conclusion 
that the results were unsatisfactory and the Bulgarian leadership and society had not understood 
how much time they had lost and how much work has to be done.  
Members of the new government believe that their change of policy and good 
intentions are enough to merit serious consideration. Though Bulgaria now 
appears serious in its quest, unfortunately it has lost seven years. Bulgaria is still 
trying to understand what is expected of it and remains ill prepared.87  
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 Simon explains the need for the Bulgarian political elite as well as the population at large 
to understand how much they were lagging behind. Related, he highlights the need of better 
education on NATO membership issue and the benefit of it. 
In sum, Bulgarian politicians have taken little action toward Euro-Atlantic 
integration until recently. As a result, their knowledge of, and experience with, 
NATO remains relatively limited. Though the new government has taken some 
encouraging new steps, Bulgarians need to understand how far behind their 
previous governments’ actions have put them.88  
 
Additionally, Simon makes it clear that NATO and US should work with Bulgaria to 
help the country to cope with the problems and to progress ahead. In his article the author came 
up with concrete recommendations as to how this should be done. 
The Defense Ministry needs help to reform. The U.K. ministry of defense 
should be encouraged to provide a top-down assessment, as it has already 
done for Hungary and Romania. The United States needs to coordinate its 
bilateral efforts in defense budgeting, planning, and resource and personal 
management. Since further work is needed in the downsizing and redeploying of 
Bulgarian forces, military professionalism, and quality of life, U.S. bilateral 
activities should be focused in this direction.89 
 
The constructive criticism sufficiently reinforced the will of the government to pursue the 
goal of membership. The intensified dialogue with the Alliance on political, military, financial, and 
security issues related to the future membership was made an integral part of the comprehensive 
pre-accession strategy. The other priorities focused on reform of the Armed Forces, 
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strengthening of civilian control of the military and achieving interoperability with NATO forces. 
To this end the Bulgarian Parliament introduced significant changes in national legislation 
concerning defense and Armed Forces. In February 1998 the government approved a three-
staged plan to reform the Armed Forces over the next twelve years (“Plan 2010”). The goal of 
the Armed Forces reform is to develop a highly mobile, more professional and well-equipped 
force that is significantly reduced in size. The force structure will be comprised of main defense; 
rapid reaction and territorial defense forces, as well as reserves. 
The first stage of Plan 2010 covers the period 1998 – 2004. The Ministry of Defense 
formulates the major goals for this initial phase as follows: 
The aim of this plan of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense is to fulfill the 
objective in achieving the sufficient defense potential to guarantee the 
sovereignty, security and independence of the state; to defend its territorial 
integrity in case of aggression; to support effectively its foreign policy for peace, 
security and stability, so that the perceived goals of the national strategy for 
integration with European Union and NATO to be achieved.90 
 
In its quest for membership Bulgaria takes account of the importance of regional stability 
and makes efforts to that end. An example is its participation in the South East European 
Defense Ministerial process and its outcome, the Multinational Peacekeeping Forces, that 
contributes to improved neighborly relations. 
Bulgaria recognizes the importance of the regional co-operation as a key 
instrument in keeping the peace on the Balkans. We are actively participating in 
the establishment of a unique for our region form of co-operation – the 
Multinational Peacekeeping Forces South Eastern Europe. Today we are co-
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operating so that we guarantee the security and peace in the region and to 
achieve high interoperability and technical level.91 
 
At the end of the year a particular demonstration of the country’s attitude towards 
NATO was the decision of the National Assembly to permit Alliance planes fly over the country 
in case the Kosovo conflict intensified. This was a clear signal to NATO leaders that Bulgaria 
was ready to get further involved in the initiative of the Treaty it wishes to join. In his letter to 
Prime Minister Kostov, the then NATO Secretary General thanked him for Bulgaria’s stand 
and promised help in case of a possible Serbian attack against the country. “I wish to be 
perfectly clear that our Allies will treat very seriously every attack of Yugoslavia against a 
country – partner of NATO.”92 
 The sustained efforts of the country continued in 1999 as well. On 8 April 1999 the 
National Assembly approved the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria, which considers 
its security and defence as related to the regional, European and Euro-Atlantic security and 
defence systems. The Military Doctrine defines the partnership and membership in NATO, the 
WEU and EU as a strategic priority for ensuring the country’s national security and defence.93 
In addition it reflects the broader implications of NATO and EU membership. 
The Republic of Bulgaria considers its membership in NATO and the EU as an 
opportunity to share the responsibility of democratic states in defending 
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common values as a prerequisite and guarantee of a stable democratic 
development of the country and pursuit of effective defence policies.94 
 
 Later that month Bulgaria had a chance to translate the words into practice. When 
NATO again asked whether the country was ready to provide the Alliance with access to its 
airspace during air strikes on Yugoslavia the government had to cope with a great opposition 
coming from the Bulgarian Socialist Party and its supporters, and to make sure that the 
constitution and major laws of the country were taken into consideration. When the decision 
about providing NATO with access to the country’s airspace was voted in Parliament the BSP 
deputies were the only ones who were against. Despite BSP’s position the parliamentary groups 
of the Union of Democratic Union, the Popular Union, the Euroleft and the Alliance for 
Salvation of Bulgaria supported the final decision in favor of reaching an agreement with NATO. 
In addition the BSP was leading an active anti-NATO propaganda among its 
supporters. The statements made by the BSP leaders increased the fears and concerns of the 
population at large. They manipulated the traditional Bulgarian love for peace and promoted the 
idea that NATO is preparing for a military aggression against a sovereign state. BSP’s 
functionaries focused on the fact that while the West is far way from Bulgaria, Serbia has been, 
is and will be a neighbor of Bulgaria. In their propaganda the socialists went to the extreme of 
depicting Milosevich as a wise statesman, caring for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of his 
country.  
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 The government, although, acknowledged the concerns of the population. Prime 
Minister Ivan Kostov articulated the understanding of the leadership in his discussions in NATO 
HQ about the security guarantees that the Alliance can offer to Bulgaria. 
Nobody likes to have a war raging next door. And I can tell you that the war is 
being heard from next door by the communities close to Bulgaria’s Western 
border, and this can not but cause concern in people, so concern, fears, indeed 
- in the Bulgarian public is that other factor that makes any decision indeed 
difficult.95 
 
The Premier mindful of the broader political context and Bulgaria’s priorities stated that 
“Bulgaria wants to become a NATO member, so NATO’s request to use its air space is a 
chance to demonstrate its credentials.”96 
 In addition to providing NATO with access to its airspace Bulgaria undertook measures 
to alleviate the plight of the Kosovo refugees. The National Assembly through its Declaration on 
the Escalation of the Kosovo Crisis decided to help Macedonia and Albania in settling the 
refugee problem. Bulgaria took charge of the refugee camp Radusha, Macedonia. The 
government through the Ministry of Defense provided food, clothes and shelter to several 
thousands people. 
 As a result of the sustained efforts of the country, the progress in the field of military 
reform, civil society and improvement of the relations with the neighbors, as well as the 
categorical stance on the issue of NATO membership, Bulgaria was explicitly mentioned in the 
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Final Communique of the NATO Washington Summit and became one of the nine MAP 
countries. 
 US President Clinton’s message during his visit to Bulgaria in November 1999 was 
encouraging about the way ahead .In some ways after the Kosovo conflict there is a more 
compelling case that can be made for NATO looking toward the nations of Southeast Europe in 
the next wave.”97 
C. THE WAY AHEAD 
Cognizant of the importance of regional co-operation and stability Bulgaria is taking part 
in the establishment and functioning of the Multinational Peacekeeping Forces South Eastern 
Europe, which are the outcome of the South East European Defense Ministerial process. The 
process itself was not easy but the countries in the region managed to find common grounds and 
good will to complete it within less than two years. The beginning was laid on 31 March 1996 in 
Tirana, Albania where the First South East European Defense ministerial took place. Italy (then 
chairing the EU) and the United States of America were in an observer capacity, while Greece, 
Romania and Slovenia did not participate. The Bulgarian representatives were “concerned” with 
the prospective “formation of the so called South Balkans,” in other words putting into place 
new dividing lines in Europe, and they insisted on “a comprehensive approach to the problems 
of the region with the participation of all the interested countries.”98 The Ministerial did not take 
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any concrete decisions but the participants agreed to have the next meeting in Sofia with 
enlarged participation as early as the autumn of that year. It was not known that the domestic 
situation in Bulgaria would not be good enough for the success of such a meeting. Of note, this 
Ministerial outlines the major principle of the new type of regional co-operation aimed at 
speeded integration of the countries in the European and Euro Atlantic structures. 
 The next step was made on 3 October 1997 in Sofia, Bulgaria, where the Second 
Defence Ministerial was held. All the countries form the region took part in it plus the United 
States, NATO, WEU, OSCE representatives and all EAPC countries in an observer capacity. 
The Ministers adopted a Joint Statement with annexed Follow up with concrete steps for co-
operation. Two elements are important: the SEDM process permanently and categorically tied 
itself with “The direct integration of the region in the Trans Atlantic community”99 reiterating the 
will of the participants to share common values through a series of concrete activities, and the 
decision to establish Multinational Peace Forces. 
 This second SEDM also took account of the importance of the regional cooperation 
and strengthening of confidence and security in the Balkans. 
They [the Ministers] agree that the integration of South-Eastern European states 
into European security organizations, including an early NATO membership of 
the aspiring countries participating in the meeting, would be facilitated immensely 
by the expansion of regional defence cooperation and confidence - and 
security-building measures.100 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 





 The Second SEDM obliged the participants to implement concrete activities in the 
region within the framework of the EAPC aimed at establishing the necessary synergy for 
action. Expert meetings, eight within one year, started with the task to develop an Agreement 
for the Establishment of regional peace forces. At their first meeting in Tirana in May 1998, the 
Deputy Ministers of Defence signed a Letter of Intention to establish Multinational Peace 
Forces in the region. This act served as a confirmation of the irreversibility of the negotiation 
process on the establishment of regional peace forces.  
Additionally, Bulgaria tried to engage the EAPC with the problems of military co-
operation in South Eastern Europe. As a result of the initiative of the Bulgarian Minister of 
Defense, Gueorgui Ananiev in June 1998 NATO’s Working Group on Military Co-operation 
organized a discussion on the Common Modalities of Partnership Multinational Formations. 
Since in other regions initiatives of similar character are in the process of 
development, today I would like to make a proposal - to make an analysis and 
develop the common modalities of the multinational regional formations within 
the framework of the EAPC, which are applicable no matter what their 
concrete character is. In this way the optimum ways for achieving 
interoperability with those of NATO formations will be found.101 
 
This initiative demonstrated a mature approach to the problems of “multinationality” at a 
moment when IFOR, SFOR and ALBA had accomplished an unprecedented level of military 
co-operation and integration based on common political goals. The Partner nations declared 
                                                                 




their readiness to share the responsibilities of NATO-led operations with troops on the ground. 
According to the Partners an over-arching Concept of Common Modalities of Multinational 
Formations would contribute to the operational character of the co-operation between them and 
NATO. 
 On 25 September 1998 in Skopje, Macedonia in the context of increasing tension in 
Kosovo the Third SEDM took place. It adopted a new Joint Statement with Follow on 
Measures and Activities. The Ministers of Defence of seven countries (Slovenia and US 
pertained their observer status) signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the Multinational 
Peacekeeping Forces South Eastern Europe. This was a unique event in the diplomatic history 
of the region within the last century. For the first time countries that have been either deadly 
enemies or best partners signed an agreement as equal partners. Of note, the Ministers of 
Defence during the debates stated their concern with the evolving conflict in the region. They 
expressed their support for UN Security Council Resolution 1199 on Kosovo and insisted for 
active engagement of the international community in finding a quick and permanent solution of 
the problems. 
 The signed Agreement for the Establishment of MPFSEE was the regional response to 
NATO’s CJTF and the provisions of the 1998 Madrid Declaration.102 The Parties made sure 
that the activities of the Multinational Brigade were consistent with the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations. The initiative was neither directed against any third state, nor intended to 
form a military alliance against any country or group of countries. According to this Agreement 
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the force would be available for possible employment in UN or OSCE mandated NATO-led or 
WEU-led conflict prevention operations. The location of the multinational brigade called South 
East European Brigade (SEEBRIG) would be on a four-year rotational basis, starting on the 
date of its activation, and would be hosted by four of the participating nations Bulgaria, 
Romania, Turkey and Greece. The SEEBRIG would be an “on-call” land force. The units 
allocated to it would remain at their permanent home base locations, and would come together 
to form the appropriate force packages for exercises /training activities and contingencies. A 
Political Military Steering Committee would be established as a joint executive body for 
oversight and to provide policy guidance for the SEEBRIG activities. For two years Greece 
would be hosting the PMSC.103 
In May 1999 Sofia, Bulgaria hosted the Second Meeting of Deputy Ministers of 
Defense. This meeting, held weeks after the end of the “ALLIED FORCE” operation, was 
important in the context of the humanitarian crisis in neighboring Yugoslavia. It coincided with 
the beginning of the lessons learned process from NATO’s operation to include institutional, 
military-political, and military technical level. In addition, a subject of the debates was the 
implementation of the decisions taken by the Washington Summit. An assessment of the realized 
after Skopje’98 initiatives was done and new ideas were formulated. New imperatives were 
outlined to include harmonization of the national legislations, crisis management procedures, and 
exchange of information on the military reforms. The Second Meeting of Deputy-Ministers of 
Defense envisioned consultations on Article 10 and 11 of the Washington Treaty among the 
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three new NATO members Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and the MAP countries 
form the region. The idea to establish an Information Network for actions during crisis was 
adopted with consensus. The Deputy Minister of Defense agreed on the establishment of a task 
force that would be able to participate in the reconstruction of the region and planned for expert 
meetings, which would substantiate the idea. The participants in the meeting declared their will 
for a global approach to the problems of SEE, excluding any of the partial decisions made often 
in the most recent history of the region.104 As for the place and role of the SEDM process 
within the broad framework of prospective NATO membership the meeting concluded: 
The SEDM process can definitely be a positive contribution to accelerating the 
NATO enlargement process in South-Eastern Europe - through a series of 
membership-oriented initiatives the aspiring countries from the region will be 
encouraged to act as “regional stabilizers”, which is unquestionably the most 
essential political prerequisite for accession in NATO.105 
 
On 11 September 1999 in Plovdiv, Bulgaria with the ceremony of the HQ of the 
Multinational Peace Force South Eastern Europe was officially inaugurated. This was a 
watershed event in the evolution of the SEDM process. Platoons from Albania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey marched in front of the President of the 
Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministers of Defence of the regional countries. In his address the 
SEEBRIG Commander Major General Ethem Erdagi from the Turkish General Staff stated: 
The MPFSEE will provide a unique, historic, golden opportunity for the Armies 
of the region to substantially contribute to the regional security and stability as 
well as improve solidarity. I would like to stress that such a peace force will 
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come into being for the first time in the Balkans, and may play a significant role 
leading the stability and security in the region.106 
 
The Fourth South East European Defence Ministerial held on 30 November 1999 in 
Bucharest, Romania outlined new tendencies in the regional defense co-operation, reflecting the 
pragmatism of these countries. As a result of the events in the region to include the humanitarian 
crisis in Kosovo and the number of devastating earthquakes in Greece and Turkey Bulgaria 
recognized the need of deepening of the co-operation. Through its Minister of Defense Bulgaria 
made a concrete proposal towards consolidation and bringing more substance to the overall 
cooperation aiming at enhanced efforts in the field of civil-emergency planning. 
For the SEDM to consider the possibility for the establishment of a Civil-
Military Emergency Planning Council with the participation of the countries 
from the region - Turkey, Greece, Rumania, Macedonia, Slovenia, Albania, 
Bulgaria and Italy. This Council will provide a permanent exchange of 
information and will facilitate the co-operation processes improving in this way 
the regional capacity for timely reaction in case of disasters, catastrophes and 
accidents.107 
 
The Defense Ministerial held in October 2000 in Thessaloniki, Greece added substance 
to the growing pattern of co-operation on practical problem solving and security building 
measures emanating from within the region. 
 Of note, in a short period of time the SEEBRIG accomplished significant results in joint 
training and developing its operational capabilities. It has conducted two exercises – CPX 
SEEBRIG 1999 (8-11 December 1999 in Plovdiv, Bulgaria) and CPFX SEVEN STARS 
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2000 (17-30 September 2000 at Koren Corps Range, Bulgaria). 
 The military reform is another indication of Bulgaria’s desire and willingness to join the 
Alliance. Aiming at future membership Bulgaria is downsizing its Armed Forces. According to 
the Military Doctrine at the end of the reform the country’s Armed Forces will comprise of 45 
000 troops and 5000 civilians. In addition the military are working hard to achieve 
interoperability with NATO troops. As an example they are endeavouring to establish C4I 
system that would contribute to the interoperability of the Bulgarian troops with those of 
NATO. The country is developing renovation plans of a military airfield so that NATO planes 
can land in Bulgaria. While the Ministry of Defense is focusing on the logistics of the Bulgarian 
troops in SEEBRIG it provides excellent conditions for the functioning of the Brigade HQ in 
Plovdiv. The Bulgarian troops participating in SEEBRIG have to be up to the best standards 
since they are and in the future will interact with NATO troops on a regular basis. In December 
2000, NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson’s letter to Bulgarian Prime Minister 
Ivan Kostov served as a proof of the right direction the military reform is taking. In the letter, 
aimed to contribute to the speeding up of the military reform, Lord Robertson points out that the 
plans to establish small in size, highly efficient armed forces are heading in the right direction. 
The Secretary General highlights the need of a closer co-operation between the civilian and 
military leadership in order to provide the best possibilities for career development, education 
and training of the Bulgarian military. The decision of the Bulgarian leaders to modernise the 
military equipment and achieve interoperability in the field of air defense, troops control and 
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command, and logistics is defined by the Alliance as “very reasonable.”108 NATO Secretary 
General, being aware of the importance of the military reform for the security of a country, as 
well as how difficult it is to take political decisions related to the reform, particularly those 
dealing with downsizing of the officer corps, expresses his and the Alliance support for Bulgaria. 
This support gives impetus to those devoted to carry out the reforms. 
Mr, Prime Minister, I am personally determined to support the military reform in 
all partner countries and I would like to reiterate NATO’s will to support and 
contribute to your efforts. I would once again like to commend your 
engagement with the security and stability in Europe, as demonstrated during the 
Kosovo crisis. NATO in the future as well will co-operate with Bulgaria and 
will assist your efforts in the preparing for membership. Actively reforming the 
military can be a good credential, indicative of Bulgaria’s determination to join 
NATO and the EU.109 
 
As far as Bulgaria’s participation in PfP and its IPP are concerned, account should be 
taken that:  
On the basis of the Washington Summit Initiatives, Bulgaria specified its 
priorities concerning participation in the PfP and commitments relevant to future 
NATO membership. They are set out in the MAP Annual National Programme 
and in the package of Partnership Goals (PGs) approved for Bulgaria within the 
third PARP cycle. The tailored IPP for 2000-2001 is developed on the basis of 
the priority areas of the Annual National Program and supports the 
implementation of the 82 PGs within the expanded and adapted PARP. For the 
year 2000, the tailored IPP for Bulgaria includes about 450 activities, 35 of 
which hosted by Bulgaria. The Programme includes 26 exercises (4 host 
nation), 16 of which are NATO/PfP exercises and 10 - “in the spirit of PfP” 
exercises.110 
                                                                 
108 Letter of NATO Secretary General Lord G.Robertson to Prime Minister Ivan Kostov, Available 
[Online]:<http://www.standardnews.com/archive2001/01/24/Theday/story3.htm,[28 January 2001] 
109 Ibid. 




In terms of the MAP Bulgaria was among those aspirant nations who supported the idea 
to accept MAP as an instrument for accession preparation. Of note, Bulgaria states its position 
that after it becomes a member of NATO, it will maintain its support to NATO Open Doors 
Policy. 
Bulgaria has developed its Annual National Program based on the MAP. The ANP 
determines the objectives for membership preparation to include the planned period, concrete 
activities, responsible officials, and time frame. In accordance with the MAP and aimed at 
building a mechanism to coordinate the activities for preparation and membership in NATO a 
special structure within the government was developed. It focuses on planning, co-ordination 
and control over the activities related to Bulgaria's efforts for intensive co-operation and 
integration. 111  
In addition, Bulgaria is working on the exchange of expertise with the three new 
members of the Alliance. As a result in September 1999 the first expert meeting on preparation 
for NATO accession of the South-Eastern European countries with the newly accepted 
members from Central Europe was organised in Sofia. In October 2000 Bulgaria hosted the 
First Summit of the Defence Ministers of the Aspiring Countries with the participation of NATO 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Striving towards NATO membership Bulgaria got to know the real meaning of a Jewish 
proverb that looks paradoxical at first glance and reads “I am realistic that’s why I believe in 
miracles.” In the eleven years of democratisation the country managed to put behind for good 
the legacy of the communist past, to establish working institutions, and reintegrate into the 
community of free and democratic nations. It made its civilizational choice to belong to the 
world of stability and prosperity. Bulgaria was realistic in its efforts to establish peace, security, 
confidence and co-operation in the Balkans. It was realistic and consistent working within the 
framework of PfP. The participation in and hosting of a sufficient number of PfP exercises, as 
well as the contribution to SFOR and KFOR prove the country’s will. Nowadays Bulgaria 
through its IPP and Annual MAP Programme is striding towards the next wave of NATO 
Enlargement. In view of the future membership a great number of changes were made in the 
field of legislation and serious downsizing of the Armed Forces, aimed at achieving 
interoperability with the Alliance assets. The behaviour of the country during the crisis in Boznia 
and Herzegovina and in Kosovo made the case for its inclusion in the processes of European 
and NATO integration. After 1997 through its consistent policy Bulgaria proved that it would 
make a reliable and dependable member of NATO, which hopefully will become a reality soon. 
In addition to its work within the specific parameters set by the membership criteria, the country 
endeavours to improve the stability, security and confidence in the Balkans. Examples of 
Bulgaria’s efforts are its engagement in the SEDM process and substantial contribution to the 
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Multinational Peacekeeping Forces South Eastern Europe. Bulgaria hosts and provides 
excellent condition for the functioning of the HQ of the Multinational force and actively 
participates in all its activities, training and exercises. Bulgaria’s biggest accomplishment is that 
throughout the SEDM process and the establishment of the South Eastern Brigade, the country 
managed to get together at the negotiation table Greece and Turkey. These partnership and co-
operation modalities improve the confidence and stability necessary for the region. 
The possibility for future Bulgarian membership in NATO is encouraging. Factors such 
as its pro-western President, who advances a positive worldview of Bulgaria and a stable 
government, contribute to Bulgaria’s efforts aimed at membership in the Alliance. Additionally, 
Bulgaria’s NATO-member neighbours Greece and Turkey strongly support future membership. 
Tri-national projects and efforts initiated by these countries show they can work together, 
thereby, improving regional stability. 
Bulgaria has a good team, as represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 
Minister of Defense, dealing with the membership issues. During the last meeting between 
Bulgaria and the NATO Council in 19 plus 1 format, held in May 2000 in NATO HQ, the 
country’s representatives gave excellent responses to the outstanding issues and showed that 
Bulgaria is taking into consideration the most important aspects of the preparation for 
membership. As a result of this meeting it became clear that the staff is learning from the past 
mistakes. Of note, the important issue of funding was raised at that meeting. The MAP itself is 
an expensive undertaking. The country representatives put NATO in a difficult position by 
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asking whether it was worth taking money from society and putting it into MAP was the right 
thing to do. They were looking for NATO’s reassurance that Bulgaria is going in the right 
direction.112 
Bulgaria and all MAP countries have to understand an important aspect of the MAP. 
The MAP and the defense reforms done by those countries are not for the sake of NATO, and 
NATO does not require them. The MAP countries have to implement defense reforms for their 
own good. Bulgaria has to carry out its defense reform no matter whether it will become NATO 
member or not. Today the status of the Armed Forces is far from being ideal. While defense 
reform does not necessarily mean new equipment and supplies, it means modernization, making 
the existing ones more efficient and effective.113 
The need for the defense reform was well articulated by NATO Secretary General 
Lord Robertson in his address to the MAP Defense Ministers Conference, held in Sofia, 
Bulgaria on 13 October 2000. 
Defence reform, in my view, carries very special and significant importance for 
your countries. First and foremost, defence reform is about meeting your 
national defence and security needs, it is a national interest. Secondly, it is about 
strengthening your Partnership and your ability to contribute to the security of 
the Alliance. I believe you will all be well served to keep this broad perspective 
on defence reform in mind. To do otherwise could risk the solid foundation that 
is required. 
Defence reform is a long -term project. Our challenge over the next several 
years is help you set the proper course, to set the right vectors for change. We 
                                                                 
112 This information was provided to the author of this thesis by Mr.George Katzirdakis in a special 




need to be realistic; the defence reform required cannot and will not happen 
overnight. And it will not be easy or without pain.114 
 
Up to now when explaining the strategic importance of its wish for membership, 
Bulgaria was strongly pulling the card of the troublemaker Yugoslavia. Not so long ago 
everybody wanted to surround Yugoslavia with NATO. The changed situation in Yugoslavia 
with its new President, new Government and attempts at democratisation is a positive signal for 
sufficient changes in the country, which have their impact on the region. While this is good for 
the region as a whole, the new situation in Yugoslavia is taking away Bulgaria’s strongest card 
when the country explains why it should become NATO member as soon as possible. Related, 
Bulgaria should review its argumentation and should be taken on its own merit. When reviewing 
its argumentation for membership in the Alliance, it might be wise for Bulgaria to consider a 
scenario in which Russia becomes offensive. In such a scenario, if Bulgaria is closer to the 
Alliance, it can provide greater control of the Black Sea.115 In terms of future membership 
account should be taken that “ In other words, entry into NATO is not automatic and the 
decision to invite new members will still be, in the end, a political one as well.”116 
                                                                 
114 Speech by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General at the MAP Defence Ministers Conference, Sofia, 
Bulgaria, 13 October 2000, Available[Online]:<http://www.nato.int./docu/speech/2000/soo1013c.htm.[5 
February 2001] 
115 This information was provided to the author of this thesis by Mr.George Katzirdakis in a special 
interview during his visit to NPS, Monterey, CA on 5 February 2001  
116 Speech by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General at the MAP Defence Ministers Conference, Sofia, 




Of note, in the case of Bulgaria, in spite of the slow and unsteady start as well as the lost 
time, the recent years “ have seen a more tolerant, more prosperous nation moving – with 
renewed hope and ever greater confidence-closer to Europe. There are indeed good grounds 
for optimism and hope that Bulgaria is now firmly on course for a more secure future.”117 
                                                                 
117 Trevor Waters, Bulgaria-Now on Track for a Secure Furure?, 
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APPENDIX 1.  PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
BULGARIA118 
In compliance with the Bulgarian Constitution the Bulgarian Parliament has only one 
chamber, comprised of 240 MPs, elected for a period of four years. The MPs are elected on 
the basis of proportional representation with a 4 per cent electoral threshold. Because of which 
the smaller parties are encouraged to enter coalitions. The voters vote en bloc for a particular 
electoral list, i.e. vote without expressing preferences for the selection of candidates and/or the 
ranked order of the listed candidates. 
In the last election held in 1997 the Union of Democratic Forces won the majority seats 
in Parliament. The Bulgarian Socialist Party comes next, followed by the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms the Euroleft Party, and the Bulgaria Business Block as well as a couple of 
independent MPs. 
The Union of Democratic Forces is a right hand coalition comprising of a number of 
smaller parties. 
· The Bulgarian Socialist Party inherited the Bulgarian Communist Party. 
· The Euroleft is a party that came into being as a fraction of the BSP. 
· The Movement for Rights and Freedoms is an ethnic party. 
· The next elections are due in May 2001. 
 
                                                                 
118 Stan Berlung, Tomas Hellen, Frank H.Aarebot, The handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, 






























APPENDIX 2.  LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ANP – Annual National Plan 
BSP – Bulgarian Socialist Party 
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe 
CSCE – Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CJTF – Combined Joint Task Forces 
EAPC – Euro Atlantic Partnership Council 
ESDI – European Security and Defense Identity 
EU – European Union 
IFOR – Implementation Force 
IO – Interoperability Objective 
IPP – Individual Partnership Program 
HQ – Headquarters 
MAP – Membership Action Plan 
MPFSEE – Multinational Peacekeeping Force South Eastern Europe 
NAC – North Atlantic Council 
NACC – North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PARP – Planning and Review Process 
PfP – Partnership for Peace 
PWP – Partnership Work Program 
SEE – South Eastern Europe 
SEEBRIG – South Eastern Brigade 
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SEDM – South East European Defense Ministerial 
SFOR – Stabilization Force 
SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
STANAG – Standardized Agreement 
UDF – Union of Democratic Forces 
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